Bateson — Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972): главы о схизмогенезе

Неизменяемый источник. OCR со скана (562 стр.), поэтому возможны артефакты распознавания. Извлечены четыре главы, относящиеся к схизмогенезу. Номера страниц — по изданию (в OCR они идут колонтитулами «Steps to an Ecology of Mind NN»).

Библиография: Bateson G. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. — San Francisco: Chandler, 1972.

Содержание выписки:

Culture Contact and Schismogenesis (1935) — с. 61–72
Morale and National Character (1942) — с. 88–106
Bali: The Value System of a Steady State (1949) — с. 107–127
From Versailles to Cybernetics (1966) — с. 469–477

Полная книга в vault не сохранена; при необходимости OCR других глав (Theory of Play, Double Bind, The Cybernetics of “Self”) делается тем же способом.

1. Culture Contact and Schismogenesis (1935)

Culture Contact and Schismogenesis* The Memorandum written by a Committee of the Social Sciences Research Council (Man, 1935, 162) has stimulated me to put forward a point of view which differs considerably from theirs; and, though the beginning of this article may appear to be critical of their Memorandum, I wish to make it clear from the outset that I regard as a real contribution any serious attempt to devise categories for the study of cul- ture contact. Moreover, since there are several passages in the Memorandum (among them the Definition) which I do not perfectly understand, my criticisms are offered with some hesitation, and are directed not so much against the Com- _ mittee as against certain errors prevalent among anthropolo- gists. (1) The uses of such systems of categories, In general it is unwise to construct systems of this sort until the prob- lems which they are designed to elucidate have been clearly formulated; and so far as-I can see, the categories drawn up by the Committee have been constructed not in reference to any specifically defined problems, but to throw a general _ *The whole controversy of which this article was a part has been reprinted in Beyond the Frontier, edited by Paul Bohannon and Fred Plog. But the ripples of this controversy have long since died down, and the article is included here only for its positive contributions. It is reprinted, unchanged, from Man, Article 199, Vol. XXXV, 1935, by permission of the Royal Anthropologi- cal Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. 61 62 Steps to an Ecology of Mind light on “the problem” of acculturation, while the problem “% itself remains vague. | 3 (2) From this it follows that our immediate need is not -% so much the construction of a set of categories which will throw a light on all the problems, but rather the schematic formulation of the problems in such a way that they may be separately investigable. | 3 (3) Although the Committee leave their problems un- “ defined, we may from a careful reading of the categories = gather roughly what questions they are asking of the material, _: It seems that the Committee have, as a matter of fact, been : influenced by the sort of questions which administrators ask of anthropologists—“Is it a good thing to use force in culture contacts?” “How can we make a given people accept a cer tain sort of trait?” and so on. In response to this type of © question we find in the definition of acculturation an empha- = sis upon difference in culture between the groups in contact and upon the resulting changes; and such dichotomies as that between “elements forced upon a people or received volun- tarily by them”! may likewise be regarded as symptomatic of this thinking in terms of administrative problems. The same may be said of the categories V, A, B, and C, “accep- tance, “adaptation” and “reaction.” : (4) We may agree that answers are badly needed to these - questions of administration and, further, that a study of cul- - ture contacts is likely to give these answers, But it is almost - certain that the scientific formulation of the problems of con- tact will not follow these lines, It is as if in the construction of categories for the study of criminology we started with — a dichotomy of individuals into criminal and ‘noncriminal —and, indeed, that curious science was hampered for a long while by this very attempt to define a “criminal type.” (5) The Memorandum is based upon a fallacy: that we can classify the traits of a culture under such headings as economic, religious, etc. We are asked, for example, to clas- = sify traits into three classes, presented respectively because %- of: (a) economic profit or political dominance; (b) desirabil- ~ ity of bringing about conformity to values of donor group; «4 and (c) ethical and religious considerations. This idea, that each trait has either a single function or at least some one 3 4In any case it is clear that in a scientific study of 4 processes and natural laws this invocation of free will can have no place. oo SS Fi ae re ? ” be , “4 a, 7 . | 7 ae : “ . os r et a ee ~ot: 2 Roe 4 . . ‘ pt eS” a”) See tt ¥ ee be, ae “4 zt 7 where the bundle of traits which make up one institution are alike in their major functions, The weakness of this meth. od of subdividing a culture has been conclusively demon- strated by Malinowski and his pupils, who have shown that almost the whole of a culture may be seen variously as a mechanism for modifying and satisfying the sexual needs of the individuals, or for the enforcement of the norms of be- havior, or for supplying the individuals with food.2 From this exhaustive demonstration we must expect that any single trait of a culture will prove on examination to be not simply eco- nomic or religious or structural, but to partake of all these qualities according to the point of view from which we look

Cf. Malinowski, Sexual Life and Crime and Custom: A. I. Richards, Hunger and Work. This question of the subdivision of a culture into “institutions” is not quite as simple as I have indicated: and, in spite of their own works, I believe that the London School still adheres to a theory that some such division is practicable. It is likely that confusion arises from the fact that certain native peoples—perhaps all, but in any case those of Western Europe—actually think that their culture is so subdivided. Various cultural phenomena also contribute something toward such a subdivision, e.g. (a) the division of labor and differentiation of norms of be- havior between different groups of individuals in the same community, and (b) an emphasis, present in certain cultures, upon the subdivisions of place and time upon which behavior is ordered. These phenomena lead to the possibility, in such cultures, of dubbing all behavior which, for example, takes place in church between 11.30 and 12.30 on Sundays as “religious.” But even in the study of such cultures the anthropologist must look with some suspicion upon his Classification of traits: into institutions and must expect fo find a great deal of over- lapping between various institutions, An analogous fallacy occurs in psychology, and con-. sists in regarding behavior as classifiable according to the impulses which inspire it, e.g., into such categories as self-protective, assertive, sexual, acquisitive, etc. Here, foo, confusion results from the fact that not only the psychologist, but also the individual studied, is prone to think in terms of these categories. The psychologists would do well to accept the probability that every bit of behavior is—at least in a well-integrated individual —simultaneously relevant to all these abstractions, 64 | Steps to an Ecology of Mind at it, If this be true of a culture seen in synchronic section, then it must also apply to the diachronic processes of culture contact and change; and we must expect that for the offering, acceptance or refusal of every trait that are simultaneous causes of an economic, structural, sexual, and religious nature. (6) From this it follows that our categories “religious,” “economic,” etc., are not real subdivisions which are present in the cultures which we study, but are merely abstractions which we make for our own convenience when we set out to describe cultures in words. They are not phenomena pres- ent in culture, but are labels for various points of view which we adopt in our studies. In handling such abstractions we must be careful to avoid Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” a fallacy into which, for example, the Marxian historians fall when they maintain that economic “phe- nomena” are “primary.” With this preamble, we may now consider an alternative scheme for the study of contact phenomena. (7) Scope of the inquiry 1 suggest that we should con- sider under the head of “culture contact” not only those cases in which the contact occurs between two communities with different cultures and results in profound disturbance of the culture of one or both groups; but also cases of contact within a single community. In these cases the contact is between differentiated groups of individuals, e¢.g., between the sexes, between old and young, between aristocracy and plebs, be- tween clans, etc., groups which live together in approximate equilibrium. I would even extend the idea of “contact” so widely as to include those processes whereby a- child is molded and trained to fit the culture into which he was born,’ but for the present we may confine ourselves to contacts be- tween groups of individuals, with different cultural norms of behavior in each group. (8) If we consider the possible end of the drastic distur- *The present scheme is oriented toward the study of social rather than psychological processes, but a closely analogous scheme might be constructed for the study of psychopathology. Here the idea of “contact” would be studied, especially in the contexts of the molding of the individual, and the processes of schismogenesis would be seen to play an important part not only in accentuat- ing the maladjustments of the deviant, but also in as- similating the normal individual to his group. Steps.to an Ecology of Mind 65 bances which follow contacts between profoundly different communities, we see that the changes must theoretically re- sult in one or other of the following patterns: (a) the complete fusion of the originally different groups (b) the elimination of one or both groups (c) the persistence of both groups in dynamic equilibrium within one major community (9) My purpose in extending the idea of contact to cover the conditions of differentiation inside a single culture is to use our knowledge of these quiescent states to throw light upon the factors which are at work in states of disequilibrium. It may be easy to obtain a knowledge of the factors from their quiet working, but impossible to isolate them when they are violent. The laws of gravity cannot conveniently be studied by, observation of houses collapsing in an earth- quake. (10) Complete fusion Since this is one of the possible ends of the process we must know what factors are present in a group of individuals with consistent homogeneous pat- terns of behavior in all members of the group. An approach to such conditions may be found in any community which is in a state of approximate equilibrium but, unfortunately, our own communities in Europe are in a state of such flux that these conditions scarcely occur. Moreover, even in prim- itive communities the conditions are usually complicated by differentiation, so that we must be content with studies of such homogeneous groups as can be observed within the major differentiated communities. Our first task will be to ascertain what sorts of unity obtain within such groups, or rather—bearing in mind that we are concerned with aspects and not classes of phenomena—what aspects of the unity of the body of traits we must describe in order to get a whole view of the situation. I submit that the material, to be fully understood, must be examined in, at least, the following five separable aspects: (a) A structural aspect of unity The behavior of any one individual in any one context is, in some sense, cognitively consistent with the behavior of all the other individuals in all other contexts. Here we must be prepared to find that the inherent logic of one culture differs profoundly from that of others, From this point of view we shall see, for example, that when individual A gives a drink to individual B, that ’ 66 Steps to an Ecology of Mind behavior is consistent with other norms of behavior obtaining within the group which contains A and B. — This aspect of the unity of the body of behavior patterns may be restated in terms of a standardization of the cognitive aspects of the personalities of the individuals. We may say that the patterns of thought of the individuals are so stan- dardized that their behavior appears to them logical. (b) Affective aspects of unity In studying the culture from this point of view, we are concerned to show the emo- tional setting of all the details of behavior. We shall see the whole body of behavior as a concerted mechanism oriented toward affective satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the indi- viduals. This aspect of a culture may also be described in terms of a standardization of affective aspects of the personalities of the individuals, which are so modified by their culture that their behavior is to them emotionally consistent. | (c) Economic unity Here we shall see the whole body of behavior as a mechanism oriented toward the production and distribution of material objects. (d) Chronological and spatial unity Here we shall see the behavior patterns as schematically ordered according to time and place. We shall see A as giving the drink to B “because it is Saturday evening in the Blue Boar.” (e) Sociological unity Here we shall see the behavior of the individuals as oriented toward the integration and disin- tegration of the major unit, the Group as a whole. We shall see the giving of drinks as a factor which promotes the soli- darity of the group. (11) In addition to studying the behavior of members of the homogeneous group from all these points of view, we must examine a number of such groups to discover the effects of standardization of these various points of view in the peo- ple we are studying. We have stated above that every bit of behavior must be regarded as probably relevant to all these viewpoints, but the fact remains that some peoples are more inclined than others to see and phrase their own behavior 3 as “logical” or “for the good of the State.” (12) With this knowledge of the conditions which obtain in homogeneous groups, we shall be in a position to examine 4 the processes of fusion of two diverse groups into one. We j may even be able to prescribe measures which will either 4 Steps to an Ecology of Mind 67 promote or retard such fusion, and predict that a trait which fits the five aspects of unity can be added to a culture with- out other changes, If it does not fit, then we can search for appropriate modifications either of the culture or of the trait. (13) The elimination of one or both groups This end re- sult is perhaps scarcely worth studying, but we should at least examine any material that is available, to determine what sort of effects such hostile activity has upon the culture of the survivors, It is possible, for example, that the patterns of behavior associated with elimination of other groups may be assimilated into their culture so that they are impelled to eliminate more and more, | (14) Persistence of both groups in dynamic equilibrium This is probably the most instructive of the possible end results of contact, since the factors active in the dynamic equilibrium are likely to be identical or analogous with those which, in disequilibrium, are active in cultural change. Our first task is to study the relationships obtaining between groups of individuals with differentiated behavior patterns, and later to consider what light these relationships throw upon what are more usually called “contacts,” Every anthro- pologist who has been in the field has had opportunity of studying such differentiated groups. _ (15) The possibilities of differentiation of groups are by no means infinite, but fall clearly into two categories (a) cases in which the relationship is chiefly symmetrical, C.f., in the differentiation of moieties, clans, villages and the na- tions of Europe; and (b) cases in which the relationship is complementary, e.g., in the differentiation of social strata, classes, castes, age grades, and, in some cases, the cultural differentiation between the sexes.t Both these types of dif- “Cf. Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament, 1935, Of the communities described in this book, the Arapesh and the Mundugumor have a preponderantly symmetrical relationship between the sexes, while the Chambul}j have a complementary relationship, Among the Iatmul, a tribe in the same area, which I have studied, the rela- tionship between the sexes is complementary, but on rather different lines from that of the Chambuli, I hope shortly to publish a book on the Iatmul with sketches of their culture from the points of view a, b, and e out- lined in paragraph 10. (See Bibliography, items 1936 and 1958 B.) 68 . Steps to an Ecology of Mind ferentiation contain dynamic elements, such that when cera tain restraining factors are removed the differentiation or split between the groups increases progressively toward either # breakdown or a new equilibrium. | = (16) Symmetrical differentiation To this category may @& be referred all those cases in which the individuals in two groups A and B have the same aspirations and the same be. = havior patterns, but are differentiated in the orientation of = these patterns. Thus members of group A exhibit behavior 3) patterns A,B,C in their dealings with each other, but adopt ~4 the patterns X,Y,Z in their dealings with members of group = B, Similarly, group B adopt the patterns A,B,C among them. ‘g| selves, but exhibit X,Y,Z in dealing with group A, Thus a % position is set up in which the behavior X,Y,Z is the standard * reply to X,Y,Z. This position contains elements which may ~~ lead to progressive differentiation or schismogenesis along the = same lines, If, for example, the patterns X,Y,Z include boast. -¥ ing, we shall see that there is a likelihood, if boasting is the #] reply to boasting, that each group will drive the other into ~ excessive emphasis of the pattern, a process which if not re- |. strained can only lead to more and more extreme rivalry and 23 ultimately. to hostility and the breakdown of the whole system. _ OR (17) Complementary differentiation To this category we *. may refer all those cases in which the behavior and as- <j pirations of the members of the two groups are fundamentally 2 different, Thus members of group A treat each other with <% patterns L,M,N, and exhibit the patterns O,P,Q in dealings :;7 with group B. In reply to O,P,Q, the members of group B .. exhibit the patterns U,V,W, but among themselves they 3% adopt patterns R,S,T, Thus it comes about that O,P,Q is the a reply to U,V,W, and vice versa, This differentiation may be- come progressive. If, for example, the series, O,P,Q includes.4% patterns culturally regarded as assertive, while U,V,W in-‘3@ cludes cultural submissiveness, it is likely that submissiveness a will promote further assertiveness which in turn will promote am further submissiveness, This schismogenesis, unless it is re- 3 strained, leads to a progressive unilateral distortion of the @% personalities of the members of both groups, which results gam in mutual hostility between them and must end in the break-§ down of the system. q (18) Reciprocity Though relationships between group een Steps to an Ecology of Mind 69 « can broadly be classified into two categories, symmetrical and = complementary, this subdivision is to some extent blurred by another type of differentiation which we may describe as re- .._ ciprocal, In this type the behavior patterns X and Y are

adopted by members of each group in their dealings with the other group, but instead of the symmetrical system whereby X is the reply to X and Y is the reply to Y, we _ find here that X is the reply to Y. Thus in every single in- stance the behavior is asymmetrical, but symmetry is regained over a large number of instances since sometimes group A _ exhibit X to which group B reply with Y, and sometimes group A exhibit Y and group B reply with X, Cases in which group A sometimes sell sago to group B and the latter some- _ times sell the same commodity to A, may be regarded as reciprocal; but if group A habitually sell sago to B while ‘the latter habitually sell fish to A, we must, I think, regard the pattern as complementary, The reciprocal pattern, it may be noted, is compensated and balanced within itself and therefore does not tend toward schismogenesis. (19) Points for investigation: —— (a) We need a Proper survey of the types of behavior which can lead to schismogeneses of the symmetrical type. At present it is only possible to point to boasting and com- mercial rivalry, but no doubt there are many other patterns ’ which will be found to be accompanied by the same type of effect. | — (b) We need a survey of the types of behavior which are mutually complementary and lead to schismo geneses of the ’ second type. Here we can at present only cite assertiveness _ versus submissiveness, exhibitionism versus admiration, fos- _ tering versus expressions of feebleness and, in addition, the various possible combinations of these pairs. _ (c) We need verification of the general law assumed above, that when two groups exhibit complementary behavior to each other, the internal behavior between members of _ group A must necessarily differ from the internal behavior
between members of group B. (d) We need a systematic examination of schismogeneses of both types from the various points of view outlined in 70 Steps to an Ecology of Mind torians have given us a picture of the economic aspect of complementary schismogenesis in Western Europe. It is like- ly, however, that they themselves have been influenced un- duly by the schismogenesis which they studied and have been thereby prompted into exaggeration. (¢) We need to know something about the occurrence of reciprocal behavior in relationships which are preponderantly either symmetrical or complementary. (20) Restraining factors But, more important than any _ of the problems in the previous paragraph, we need a study ‘of the factors which restrain both types of schismogenesis, ~ At the present moment, the nations of Europe are far ad- vanced in symmetrical schismogenesis and are ready to fly at each other’s throats; while within each nation are to be observed growing hostilities between the various social strata, symptoms of complementary schismogenesis, Equally, in the | countries ruled by new dictatorships we may observe early — stages of complementary schismogenesis, the behavior of his associates pushing the dictator into ever greater pride and assertiveness. The purpose of the present article is to suggest problems and lines of investigation rather than to state the answers, .. but, tentatively, suggestions may be offered as to the factors _ controlling schismogenesis: ) (a) It is possible that, actually, no healthy equilibrated relationship between groups is either purely symmetrical or ; purely complementary, but that every such relationship con- 4 tains elements of the other type. It is true that it is easy to classify relationships into one or the other category accord-. ing to their predominant emphases, but it is. possible that 4 a very small admixture of complementary behavior in a 4 symmetrical relationship, or a very small admixture of 4 symmetrical behavior in a complementary relationship, may | go a long way toward stabilizing the position. Examples of. %4 this type of stabilization are perhaps common. The squire -; is in a predominantly complementary and not always com- -3 fortable relationship with his villagers, but if he participate “4 in village cricket (a symmetrical rivalry) but once a year, @ this may have a curiously disproportionate effect upon his. J relationship with them. — - (b) It is certain that, as in the case quoted above in which group A sell sago to B while the latter sell fish to A, complegj ey Degas ge tia Steps to a an Ecology of Mind | 71 mentary patterns may sometimes have a real stabilizing effect by promoting a mutual dependence between the groups. (c) It is possible that the Presence of a number of truly _Teciprocal elements in a relationship may tend to stabilize it, preventing the schismogenesis which otherwijse might re- sult either from symmetrical or complementary elements. But this would seem to be at best a very weak defense: on the one hand, if we conside r the effects of symmetrical schismo- genesis upon the reciprocal behavior patterns, we see that — the latter tend to be less and less exhibited. Thus, as the individuals composing the nations of Europe become more and more involved in their symmetrical international rivalries, they gradually leave off behaving in a reciprocal manner, de- But it must be noted that where the outside element is a person or group of persons, the relationship of the combined groups A and B to the outside group will always be itself a patentially schismogenic relationship of one or the other ype. Examination of multiple systems of this kind is badly points of view outlined in paragraph 10, Thus, inasmuch aspect of the matter is not here being considered, the effects of the slump upon the schismo- genesis are ignored. A complete study would be sub- divided into separate sections, each treating one of the aspects of the phenomena. 72 Steps to an Ecology of Mind needed and especially we need to. know more about the sys- tems (¢.g., military hierarchies) in which the distortion of personality is modified in the middle groups of the hierarchy _ by permitting the individuals to exhibit respect and submis- sion in dealings with higher groups while they exhibit assert- iveness and pride in dealing with the lower. (e) In the case of the European situation, there is one other possibility—a special case of contro] by diversion of attention to outside circumstances, It is possible that those. responsible for the policy of classes and nations might become conscious of the processes with which they are playing and cooperate in an attempt to solve the difficulties. This, how- ever, is not very likely to occur since anthropology and social psychology lack the prestige necessary to advise; and, with- out such advice, governments will continue to.react to each _ other’s reactions rather than pay attention to circumstances. (21) In conclusion, we may turn to the problems of the administrator faced with a black-white culture contact. His first task is to decide which of the end results outlined in paragraph 8 is desirable and possible of attainment. This de- cision he must make without hypocrisy. If he chooses fusion, then he must endeavor to contrive every step so as to promote are the conditions of consistency which are outlined (as prob- * lems for investigation) in paragraph 10, If he chooses that both groups shall persist in some form of dynamic equilib- rium, then he must contrive to establish a system in which the possibilities of schismogenesis are properly compensated or balanced against each other. But at every step in the | scheme which I have outlined there are problems which must be studied by trained students and which when solved will 4 contribute, not only to applied sociology, but to the very basis % of our understanding of human beings in society. , ey . a es . , fou 1 ant, ! u! A ”, meses 2° wo” i) ae an ’ 1 1

2. Morale and National Character (1942)

Morale and National Character* ‘We shall proceed as follows: (1) We shall examine some _ of the criticisms which can be urged against our entertaining =| any concept of “national character.” (2) This examination _ will enable us to state certain conceptual limits within which .| the phrase “national character” is likely to be valid. (3) We | shall then go on, within these limits, to outline what orders of _-. difference we may expect to find among Western nations, =| trying, by way of illustration, to guess more concretely at 2 some of these differences. (4) Lastly, we shall consider how | the problems of morale and international relations are at- fected by differences of this order. if Barriers to Any Concept of “National Character” Scientific enquiry has been diverted from questions of this = type by a number of trains of thought which lead scientists to regard all such questions as unprofitable or unsound. Be- 3% fore we hazard any constructive opinion as to the order of 33% differences to be expected among European populations, 3% therefore, these diverting trains of thought must be exam- 9m ined. a = *This essay appeared in Civilian Morale, edited by q Goodwin Watson, copyright 1942 by the Society for the g Psychological Study of Social Issues. It is here reprinted .3 by permission of the publisher. Some introductory mate- % _. Sial has been edited out. 4 88 Steps to an Ecology of Mind 89 : It is, in the first place, argued that not the people but 7 rather the circumstances under which they live differ from = one community to another; that we have to deal with dif- ,- ferences either in historical background or in current condi- tions, and that these factors are sufficient to account for all differences in behavior without our invoking any differences of character in the individuals concerned. Essentially this argument is an appeal to Occam’s Razor—an assertion that we ought not to multiply entities beyond necessity. The argument is that, where observable differences in circum- stance exist, we ought to invoke those rather than mere in- ferred differences in character, which we cannot observe. The argument may be met in part by quoting experi- mental data, such as Lewin’s experiments (unpublished ma- terial), which showed that there are great differences in the

way in which Germans and Americans respond to failure in an experimental setting. The Americans treated failure as a challenge to increase effort; the Germans responded to the same failure with discouragement. But those who argue for. the effectiveness of conditions rather than character can still _ reply that the experimental conditions are not, in fact, the same for both groups; that the stimulus value of any circum- stance depends upon how that circumstance stands out against the background of other circumstances in the life of the subject, and that this contrast cannot be the same for both groups. It is possible, in fact, to argue that since the same circum- _ stances never occur for individuals of different cultural back- ground, it is therefore unnecessary to invoke such abstractions as national character. This argument breaks down, I believe, | when it is pointed out that, in stressing circumstance rather | - than character, we would be ignoring the known facts about _ learning. Perhaps the best documented generalization in the . field of psychology is that, at any given moment, the be- havioral characteristics of any mammal, and especially of man, depend upon the previous experience and behavior of ;. that individual. Thus in presuming that character, as well f; as circumstance, must be taken into account, we are not mul- ,. tiplying entities beyond necessity; we know of the signifi- &. cance of learned character from other types of data, and it s is this knowledge which compels us to consider the additional . it 3 en tity. bf 90 Steps to an Ecology .of Mind A second barrier to any acceptance of the notion of “na- tional character” arises after the first has been negotiated. Those who grant that character must be considered can still doubt whether any uniformity or regularity is likely to obtain within such a sample of human beings as constitutes a nation. Let us grant at once that uniformity obviously does not occur, and let us proceed to consider what sorts of regularity may be expected. The criticism which we are trying to meet is likely to take five forms. (1) The critic may point to the occurrence of subcultural differentiation, to differences between the sexes, or between classes, or between occupational groups within the community. (2) He may point to the extreme heter- ogeneity and confusion of cultural norms which can be ob- served in “melting-pot” communities. (3) He may point to the accidental deviant, the individual who has undergone some “accidental” traumatic experience, not usual among those in his social environment. (4) He may point to the phenomena of cultural change, and especially to the sort of differentiation which results when one part of the community lags behind some other in rate of change. (5) Lastly, he may point to the arbitrary nature of national boundaries. These objections are closely interrelated, and the replies to them all derive ultimately from two postulates: first, that the individual, whether from a physiological or a psycho- Jogical point of view, is a single organized entity, such that all its “parts” or “aspects” are mutually modifiable and mutually interacting; and second, that a community is like- wise organized in this sense. If we look at social differentiation in a stable com- munity—say, at sex differentiation in a New Guinea tribe!—we find that it is not enough to say that the habit system or the character structure of one sex is different from that of another. The significant point is that the habit system of each sex cogs into the habit system of the other; that the *Cf, M. Mead (Sex and Temperament in Three Primi- % tive Societies, New York, Morrow, 1935), especially 4 Part IfI, for an analysis of sex differentiation among ¥ the Chambuli; also G. Bateson (Naven, Cambridge, 4 Cambridge University Press, 1936) for an analysis of -j sex differentiation among adults in Jatmul, New Guinea. 4 = ~ al ~_ Ts Se a
Steps to an Ecology of Mind 91 . behavior of each promotes the habits of the other.2 We find, . for example, between the sexes, such complementary patterns as spectatorship-exhibitionism, dominance-submission, and succoring-dependence, or mixtures of these, Never do we find mutual irrelevance between such groups, Although it is unfortunately true that we know very little about the terms of habit differentiation between classes, Sexes, occupational groups, etc., in Western nations, there is, ing in mutual contact. It is, to me, inconceivable that two differing groups could exist ‘side by side in a community with- out some sort of mutual relevance between the special] char- acteristics of one group and those of the other. Such an occur- rence would be contrary to the postulate that a community is an organized unit. We shall, therefore, presume that this generalization applies to all stable social differentiation. Now, all that we know of the mechanics of character for- mation, compensation, and the like—forces us to regard these bipolar patterns as unitary within the individual. If we know that an individual is trained in overt expression of one-ha of one of these patterns, e.g., in dominance behavior, we can sown in his personality. We have to think of the individual, in fact, as trained in dominance-submission, not in either dominance or submission. From this it follows that where we are dealing with stable differentiation within a community, we are Justified in ascribing common character to the mem. bers of that community, provided we take the precaution of describing that common character in terms of the motifs of relationship between the differentiated sections of the com- munity, The same sort of considerations will guide us in dealing | “We are considering here only those cases in which
ethological differentiation follows the sex dichotomy. It : is also probable that, where the ethos of the two sexes is ; not sharply differentiated, it would still be correct to say that the ethos of each promotes that of the other, e.g., through such mechanisms as competition and mutual imitation. Cf, M. Mead (op. cit.). - 92 _ Steps to an Ecology of Mind with our second criticism—the extremes of heterogeneity, such as occur in modern “melting-pot” communities. Suppose we attempted to analyze out all the motifs of relationship between individuals and groups in such a community as New York City; if we did not end in the madhouse long before we had completed our study, we should arrive at a picture of common character that would be almost infinitely com- plex—certainly that would contain more fine differentiations than the human psyche is capable of resolving within itself. At this point, then, both we and the individuals whom we are studying are forced to take a short cut: to treat heter- ogeneity as a positive characteristic of the common environ- ment, sti generis. When, with such an hypothesis, we begin to look for common motifs of behavior, we note the very clear tendencies toward glorying in heterogeneity for its own sake (as in the Robinson Latouche “Ballad for Americans”) and toward regarding the world as made up of an infinity of dis- connected quiz-bits (like Ripley’s “Believe It or Not”). The third objection, the case of the individual deviant, falls in the same frame of reference as that of the differentiation of stable groups. The boy on whom an English public-school education does not take, even though the original roots of his deviance were laid in some “accidental” traumatic in- cident, is reacting to the public-school system, The behavioral habits which he acquires may not follow the norms which the school intends to implant, but they are acquired in reac- tion to those very norms, He may (and often does) acquire patterns the exact opposite of the normal; but he cannot con- ceivably acquire irrelevant patterns. He may become a “bad” public-school Englishman, he may become insane, but still his deviant characteristics will be systematically related to . the norms which he is resisting, We may describe his charac- ter, indeed, by saying that it is as systematically related to the standard public-school character as the character of Iatmul natives of one sex is systematically related to the char- acter of the other sex. His character is oriented to the motifs and patterns of relationship in the society in which he lives. ; The same frame of reference applies to the fourth consider- ation, that of changing communities and the sort of differen- ; tiation which occurs when one section of a community lags 4 behind another in change. Since the direction in which a 4 change occurs will necessarily be conditioned by the status q quo ante, the new patterns, being reactions to the old, will-4 a Sz ‘= —— ~——— a ro oa 4 an pe tics - ‘dade: sal ” oe . 4 ‘ Steps to an Ecology of Mind 93 be systematically related to the old. As long as we confine ourselves to the terms and themes of this systematic rela- tionship, therefore, we are entitled to expect regularity of character in the individuals. Furthermore, the expectation and experience of change may, in some cases, be so impor- tant as to become a common character-determining factor sui generis, in the same sort of way that “heterogeneity” may have positive effects. Lastly, we may consider cases of shifting national boun- daries, our fifth criticism. Here, of course, we cannot expect that a diplomat’s signature on a treaty will immediately modi- fy the characters of the individuals whose national allegiance is thereby changed. It may even happen—for example, in cases where a preliterate native population is brought for the first time in contact with Europeans—that, for some time after the shift, the two parties to such a situation will behave in an exploratory or almost random manner, each retaining its own norms and not yet developing any special adjustments to the situation of contact, During this period, we should still not expect any generalizations to apply to both groups. Very soon, however, we know that each side does develop special patterns of behavior to use in its contacts with the other. At this point, it becomes meaningful to ask what systematic terms of relationship will describe the common character of the two groups; and from: this point on, the de-

For a discussion of the role played by “change” and “heterogeneity” in melting-pot communities, cf. M. Mead (“Educative effects of social environment as disclosed by studies of primitive societies.” Paper read at the Sym- posium on Environment and Education, University of Chicago, September 22, 1941). Also F. Alexander (“Edu- cative influence of personality factors in the environ- ment.” Paper read at the Symposium on Environment and Education, University of Chicago, September 22, 1941). ‘In the South Seas, those special modes of behavior which Europeans adopt toward native peoples, and those other modes of behavior which the native adopts toward Europeans, are very obvious. Apart from analyses of “pidgin” languages, we have, however, no psychological data on these patterns. For a description of the analogous patterns in Negro-white relationships, cf. J. Dollard (Caste and Class in a Southern Town, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937), especially Chapter XII, Accom- modation Attitudes of Negroes. 94 Steps to an Ecology of Mind gree of common character structure will increase until the two groups become related to each other just as two classes or two sexes in a stable, differentiated society.° In sum, to those who argue that human communities show too great internal differentiation or contain too great a ran- dom element for any notion of common character to apply, our reply would be that we expect such an approach to be useful (a) provided we describe common character in terms of the themes of relationship between groups and individuals within the community, and (b) provided that we allow suf- ficient time to elapse for the community to reach some de- gree of equilibrium or to accept either change or hetero- geneity as a characteristic of their human environment. | Differences Which We May Expect Between National Groups The above examination of “straw men” in the case against “yational character” has very stringently limited the scope of this concept. But the conclusions from this examination are by no means simply negative. To limit the scope of a concept is almost synonymous with defining it. We have added one very important tool to our equipment —the technique of describing the common character (or the “highest common factor” of character) of individuals in a hu— man community in terms of bipolar adjectives. Instead of despairing in face of the fact that nations are highly differ- entiated, we shall take the dimensions of that differentiation as our clues to the national character. No longer content to say, “Germans are submissive,” or “Englishmen are aloof,” we shall use such phrases as “dominant-submissive” when re- lationships of this sort can be shown to occur. Similarly, we shall not refer to “the paranoidal element in German char- acter,” unless we can- show that by “paranoidal” we mean some bipolar characteristic of German-German or German-— foreign relationships. We shall not describe varieties of char- acter by defining a given character in terms of its position on a continuum between extreme dominance and extreme submissiveness, but we shall, instead, try to use for our de- 5Cf, G, Bateson, “Culture Contact and Schismogene- j sis,” Man, 1935, 8: 199. (Reprinted in this volume.) oh gs Bee ee Steps to an Ecology of Mind 95 scriptions some such continua as “degree of interest in, or orientation toward, dominance-submission.” So far, we have mentioned only a very short list of bipolar characteristics; . dominance-submission, succoring-depen- dence, and exhibitionism-spectatorship. One criticism will | certainly be uppermost in the reader’s mind, that, in short, all three of these characteristics are clearly present in all West- erm cultures. Before our method becomes useful, therefore, we must try to expand it to give us sufficient scope and discriminatory power to differentiate one Western culture from another. As this conceptual frame develops, no doubt, many further expansions and discriminations will be introduced. The pres- ent paper will deal with only three such types of expansion. Alternatives to Bipolarity When we invoked bipolarity as a means of handling differ- | entiation within society without foregoing some notion of common character structure, we considéred only the possibil- ity of simple bipolar differentiation, Certainly this pattern is very common in Western cultures; take, for instance, Repub- lican-Democrat, political Right-Left, sex differentiation, God and the devil, and so on. These peoples even try to impose a binary pattern upon phenomena which are not dual in na- ture—youth versus age, labor versus capital, mind versus matter—and, in general, lack the organizational devices for handling triangular systems; the inception of any “third” party is always regarded, for example, as a threat to our political organization. This clear tendency toward dual sys- tems ought not, however, to blind us to the occurrence of other patterns.® 6 The Balinese social system in the mountain commvu- nities is almost entirely devoid of such dualisms. The ethological differentiation of the sexes is rather slight; political factions are completely absent, In the plains, © there is a dualism which has resulted from the intrusive Hindoo caste system, those with caste being discrimi- nated from those without caste. At the symbolic level (partly as a result of Hindoo influence) dualisms are much more frequent, however, than they are in the social structure (e.g., Northeast vs. Southwest, Gods vs. demons, symbolic Left vs. Right, symbolic Male vs. Female, etc.). a — - — OS ee 96 Steps to an Ecology of Mind There is, for example, a very interesting tendency in En- 4 glish communities toward the formation of ternary systems, such as parents-nurse-child, king-ministers-people, officers- N.C.O.’s-privates.7 While the precise motifs of relationship in these ternary systems remain to be investigated, it is im- 2 portant to note that these systems, to which I refer as “= “ternary,” are neither “simple hierarchies” nor “triangles.” By =) a pure hierarchy, I should mean a serial system in which ; face-to-face relations do not occur between members when = they are separated by some intervening member; in other = words, systems in which the. only communication between .. A and C passes through B. By a triangle I should mean a threefold system with no serial properties. The ternary sys- |: tem, parent-nurse-child, on the other hand, is very different = from either of these other forms, It contains serial elements, -. but face-to-face contact does occur between the first and the = third members. Essentially, the function of the middle mem- per is to instruct and discipline the third member in the forms “ of behavior which he should adopt in his contacts with the frst. ‘The nurse teaches the child how to behave toward its <3 parents, just as the N.C.O. teaches and disciplines the private = ‘a how he should behave toward officers. In psychoanalytic terminology, the process of introjection is done indirectly, not by direct impact of the parental personality upon the child.® 3 The face-to-face contacts between the first and third mem- @ bers are, however, very important. We may refer, in this con- 4 nection, to the vital daily ritual in the British Army, in which ¥ the officer of the day asks the assembled privates and a N.C.O.’s whether there are any complaints. % 7 A fourth instance of this threefold pattern occurs inf some great public schools (as in Charterhouse), where the authority is divided between the quieter, moreg polished, intellectual leaders (“monitors”) and thes rougher, louder, athletic leaders (captain of football,g head of long room, etc.), who have the duty of seeing” | to it that the “fags” run when the monitor calls. : Oedipus situation and the related systems of cultu all sanctions, cf. M. Mead (“Social change and cultural surrogates,” Journal of Educ. Sociol., 1940, 14: 92-128) also G. Roheim (The Riddle of the Sphinx, Londagy Hogarth Press, 1934). Steps to an Ecology of Mind 97 Certainly, any full discussion of English character ought to allow for ternary, as well.as bipolar patterns. Symmetrical Motifs So far, we have considered only what we have called “com- plementary” patterns of relationship, in which the behavior patterns at one end of the relationship are different from, _ but fit in with, the behavior patterns at the other end

(dominance-submission, etc.). There exists, however, a
whole category of human interpersonal behavior which does not conform to this description, In addition to the contrasting complemen patterns, we have to recognize the existence _ of a series of symmetrical patterns, in which people respond to what others are doing by themselves doing something simi- . Jar. In particular, we have to consider those competitive® pat- ” _ terns in which individual or group A is stimulated to more
of any type of behavior by perceiving more of that same type _ of behavior (or greater success in that type of behavior) _ in individual or group B. There is a very profound contrast between such competi- = tive systems of behavior and complementary dominance- 2 * submission systems—a highly significant contrast for any dis- “® cussion of national character, In complementary striving, the § stimulus which prompts A to greater efforts is the relative weakness in B; if we want to make A subside or submit, ; we ought to show him that B is stronger than he is. In fact, e the complementary character structure may be summarized “@ by the phrase “bully-coward,” implying the combination of eae these characteristics in the personality, The symmetrical com- gm petitive systems, on the other hand, are an almost precise mae functional opposite of the complementary. Here the stimulus maewhich evokes greater striving in A is the vision of greater vite an Oh yg tte °The term “cooperation,” which is sometimes used as the opposite of “competition,” covers a very wide variety of patterns, some of them symmetrical and others com- plementary, some bipolar and others in which the cooperating individuals are chiefly oriented to some personal or impersonal goal. We may expect that some careful-analysis of these patterns will give us vocabulary for describing other sorts of national characteristics. Such an analysis cannot be attempted in this paper. - oo 98 Steps to an Ecology of Mind strength or greater striving in B; and, inversely, if we demon- -~ strate to A that B is really weak, A will relax his efforts. = It is probable that these two contrasting patterns are alike - available as potentialities in all human beings; but clearly, 3 any individual who behaves in both ways at once will risk 4 imternal confusion and conflict. In the various national] groups, consequently, different methods of resolving this dis- crepancy have developed. In England and in America, where children. and adults are subjected to an almost continuous barrage of disapproval whenever they exhibit the comple- mentary patterns, they inevitably come to accept the ethics of “fair play.” Responding to the challenge of difficulties, they cannot, without guilt, kick the underdog.*® For British morale Dunkirk was a stimulus, not a depressant. — In Germany, on the other hand, the same clichés are appar- ently lacking, and the community is chiefly organized on the. : basis of a complementary hierarchy in terms of dominance- submission. The dominance behavior is sharply and clearly developed; yet the picture is not perfectly clear and needs further investigation, Whether a pure dominance-submission _ hierarchy could ever exist as a stable system is doubtful. It seems that in the case of Germany, the submission end of - the pattern is masked, so that overt submissive behavior is almost as strongly tabooed as it is in America or England, In place of submission, we find a sort of parade-ground im- . passivity. , A hint as to the process by which the submissive role is modified and rendered tolerable comes to us out of the inter- views in a recently begun study of German life histories. One German subject described how different was the treat- ment which he, as a boy, received in his South German home, _ from that which his sister received. He said that much more — was demanded of him; that his sister was allowed to evade discipline; that whereas he was always expected to click his 7¢ is, however, possible that in certain sections of these nations, complementary patterns occur with some - frequency—particularly among groups who have suffered - from prolonged insecurity and uncertainty, ¢.g., racial . minorities, depressed areas, the stock exchange, political - circles, etc. : : 1G, Bateson, unpublished research for the Council on4 Human Relations. 3

a Steps to an Ecology of Mind 99 gpneels and obey with precision, his sister was allowed much ore freedom. The interviewer at once began to look for in- »tersex sibling jealousy, but the subject declared that it was a greater honor for the boy to obey. “One doesn’t expect too much of girls,” he said, “What one felt they (boys) should | accomplish and do was very serious, because they had to be prepared for life.” An interesting inversion of noblesse oblige. | Combinations of Motifs | _ Among the complementary motifs, we have mentioned only | three—dominance-submission, —_ exhibitionism-spectatorship, -.and succorance-dependence—but these three will suffice to | iJlustrate the sort of verifiable hypotheses at which we can arrive by describing national character in this hyphenated | terminology.!? _ Since, clearly, all three of these motifs occur in all Western | cultures, the possibilities for international difference are limited to the proportions and ways in which the motifs are combined. The proportions are likely to be very difficult to ;. detect, except where the differences are very large. We may be sure ourselves that Germans are more oriented toward dominance-submission than are Americans, but to demon- ‘strate this certainty is likely to be difficult. To estimate differences in the degree of development of exhibitionism- : | spectatorship or succorance-dependence in the various na- tions will, indeed, probably be quite impossible. |

If, however, we consider the possible ways in which these ‘motifs may be combined together, we find sharp qualitative “differences which are susceptible of easy verification. Let us ‘assume that all three of these motifs are developed in all : gelationships in all Western cultures, and from this assump- 4 ion go on to consider which individual plays which role. _{,, It is logically possible that in one cultural environment A 7 “will be dominant and exhibitionist, while B is submissive and “For a fuller study, we ought to consider such other

motifs as aggression-passivity, possessive-possessed, agent- tool, etc. And all of these motifs will require somewhat more critical definition than can be attempted in this paper. 100 Steps to an Ecology of Mind spectator; while in another culture X may be dominant anda spectator, while Y is submissive and exhibitionist. Sis Examples of this sort of contrast rather easily come toa4 mind, Thus we may note that whereas the dominant Nazigs| - preen themselves before the people, the czar of Russia kept | J his private ballet, and Stalin emerges from seclusion only to}. review his troops. We might perhaps present the relationship :. | - between the Nazi Party and the people thus: f Party People af Dominance Submission | Exhibitionism Spectatorship . While the czar and his ballet would be represented: 7 Czar Ballet Dominance | Submission — Spectatorship = Exhibitionism proved, it is worthwhile at this point to demonstrate the Of currence of such differences by describing a rather striking’ ethnographic difference which has been documented mor@:.} - fully. In Europe, where we tend to associate succoring bes: |. havior with social superiority, we construct our paren symbols accordingly. Our God, or our king, is the “fathey!®:| | of his people. In Bali, on the other hand, the gods are thé. ; “children” of the people, and when a god speaks thro hie. 4 the mouth of a person in trance, he addresses anyone Whoent § will listen as “father.” Similarly, the rajah is ‘sajangangie 4 (“spoilt” like a child) by his people. The Balinese, furtheles. : are very fond of putting children in the combined roles ‘Gf P 4 god and dancer; in mythology, the perfect prince is polishagiines and narcissistic. Thus the Balinese pattern might be st ria | marized thus: | “eal: Since these European examples are comparatively ungy. |- ae re .*™ . Cj gt dale High Status Low Status Dependence - Succoring ’ Exhibitionism Spectatorship Steps to an Ecology of Mind — . 101 a And this diagram would imply, not only that the Balinese 7 feel dependence and exhibitionism and superior status to go a
=r % paturally together, but also that a Balinese will not readily -..combine succoring with exhibitionism (that is, Bali com- .. pletely lacks the ostentatious gift-giving characteristic of
many primitive peoples) or will be embarrassed if forced by | . the context to attempt such a combination. , . Although the analogous diagrams for our Western cultures |: eannot be drawn with the same certainty, it is worthwhile |. to attempt them for the parent-child relationships in English, American, and German cultures. One extra complication | aust, however, be faced; when we look at parent-child rela-
tionships instead of at relationships between princes and peo- | ple, we have to make specific allowance for the changes in the pattern which occur as the child grows older. Suc- | corance-dependence is undoubtedly a dominant motif in early childhood, but various mechanisms later modify this extreme . “dependence, to bring about some degree of psychological in- | dependence. —— ’’ The English upper- and middle-class system would be rep- I Zyesented diagrammatically thus: . & Parents —Chhildren

Dominance Submission

(modified by “ternary” nurse system) ® Succoring Dependence (dependence habits broken by separa-. 1s | tion—children sent to school) {@ Exhibitionism Spectatorship a (children listen silently at meals) tay In contrast with this, the analogous American pattern 1@iseems to be: Parents Children Dominance (slight) : Submission (slight) Succoring Dependence Spectatorship | Exhibitionism 102 Steps to an Ecology of Mind And this pattern differs from the English not only in the re- - versal of the spectatorship-exhibitionism roles, but also in the content of what is exhibited, The American child is en- | couraged by his parents to show off his independence. Usual- =: ly the process of psychological weaning is not accomplished <: by sending the child away to a boarding school; instead, the °| child’s exhibitionism is played off against his independence, nti the latter is neutralized, Later, from this beginning in . the exhibition of independence, the individual may sometimes : go on in adult life to show off succorance, his wife and family becoming in some degree his “exhibits.” Though the analogous German pattern probably resembles the American in the arrangement of the paired comple- mentary roles, certainly it differs from the American in that the father’s dominance is much stronger and much more con- sistent, and especially in that the content of the boy’s exhibi- tionism is quite different. He is, in fact, dominated into a overt submissive behavior. Thus, while in the American char- acter exhibitionism is encouraged by the parent as a method of psychological weaning, both its function and its content are for the German entirely different. | Differences of this order, which may be expected in all European nations, are probably the basis of many of our naive and often unkind international comments, They may, — indeed, be of considerable importance in the mechanics of | international relations, in as much as an understanding of © them might dispel some of our misunderstandings. To an American eye, the English too often appear “arrogant,” whereas to an English eye the American appears.to be “boast- ful.” If we could show precisely how much of truth and how - | much of distortion is present in these impressions, it might be a real contribution to interallied cooperation. . In terms of the diagrams above, the “arrogance” of the ; Englishman would be due to the combination of dominance -: and exhibitionism, The Englishman in a performing role (the o parent at breakfast, the newspaper editor, the political.¢ spokesman, the lecturer, or what not) assumes that he is also in a dominant role—that he can decide in accordance with’ vague, abstract standards what sort of performance to giv - —and the audience can “take it or leave it.” His own é . oe Steps to an Ecology of Mind 103 rogance he sees either as “natural” or as mitigated by his humility in face of the abstract standards. Quite unaware that his behavior could conceivably be regarded as a comment upon his audience, he is, on the contrary, aware only of be- having in the performer’s role, as he understands that role. But the American does not see it thus. To him, the “arrogant” behavior of the Englishman appears to be directed against the audience, in which case the implicit invocation of some abstract standard appears only to add insult to injury. Similarly, the behavior which an Englishman interprets as “boastful” in an American is not aggressive, although the Englishman may feel that he is being subjected to some sort of invidious comparison, He does not know that, as a matter of fact, Americans will only behave like this to people whom they rather like and respect. According to the hypothesis _ above, the “boasting” pattern results from the curious linkage whereby exhibition of self-sufficiency and independence is played off against overdependence. The American, when he boasts, is looking for approval of his upstanding indepen- dence; but the naive Englishman interprets this behavior as a bid for some sort of dominance or superiority. In this sort of way, we may suppose that the whole flavor of one national culture may differ from that of another, and that such differences may be considerable enough to lead to serious misunderstandings. It is probable, however, that these differences are not so complex in their nature as to be beyond the reach of investigation. Hypotheses of the type which we have advanced could be easily tested, and research on these lines is urgently needed. National Character and American Morale Using the motifs of interpersonal and intergroup relation- ship as our clues to national character, we have been able
to indicate certain orders of regular difference which we may expect to find among the peoples who share our Western civilization. Of necessity, our statements have been theoreti- cal rather than empirical; still, from the theoretical structure .. which we have built up, it is possible to extract certain for- s; mulas which may be useful to the builder of morale. 104 | Steps to an Ecology of Mind All of these formulas are based upon the general assump- tion that people will respond most energetically when the context is structured to appeal to their habitual patterns of reaction, It is not sensible to encourage a donkey to go up hill by offering him raw meat, nor will a lion respond to grass, (1) Since all Western nations tend to think and behave in bipolar terms, we shall do well, in building American morale, to think of our various enemies as a single hostile entity. The distinctions and gradations which intellectuals might prefer are likely to be disturbing. (2) Since both Americans and English respond most ener- getically to symmetrical stimuli, we shall be very unwise if we soft-pedal the disasters of war. If our enemies defeat us | at any point, that fact ought to be used to the maximum as a challenge and a spur to further effort. When our forces have suffered some reverse, our newspapers ought to be in | no hurry to tell us that “enemy advances have been checked.” Military progress is always intermittent, and the moment to strike, the moment when maximum morale is needed, occurs when the enemy is-solidifying his position and preparing the © next blow. At such a moment, it is not sensible to reduce the aggressive energy of our leaders and people by smug re- assurance. (3) There is, however, a superficial discrepancy between > the habit of symmetrical motivation and the need for showing self-sufficiency. We have suggested that the American: boy ~ learns to stand upon his own feet through those occasions in childhood when his parents are approving spectators of his self-sufficiency. If this diagnosis is correct, it would follow that a certain bubbling up of self-appreciation is normal and — healthy in Americans and is perhaps an essential ingredient | of American independence and strength. A too literal following of the formula above, therefore, a too great insistence upon disasters and difficulties, might lead to some loss of energy through the damming up of this spon- _ taneous. exuberance. A rather concentrated diet of “blood, .. sweat, and tears” may be good for the English; but Ameri-’ | cans, while no less dependent upon symmetrical motivation, Ee cannot feel their oats when fed on nothing but disaster. Our# public spokesmen and newspaper editors should never softej ed Steps to an Ecology of Mind 105 pedal the fact that we have a man-sized job on our hands, but they will do well to insist also that America is a man- sized nation, Any sort of attempt to reassure Americans by minimizing the strength of the enemy must be avoided, but _ frank boasts of real success are good. (4) Because our vision of the peace is a factor in our war- making morale, it is worthwhile to ask at once what light the study of national differences may throw upon the prob- lems of the peace table. We have to devise a peace treaty (a) such that Americans and British will fight to achieve it, and (b) such that it will bring out the best rather than the worst characteristics of our enemies. If we approach it scientifically, such a prob- Jem is by no means beyond our skill. The most conspicuous psychological hurdle to be negoti- ated, in imagining such a peace treaty, is the contrast be- tween British and American symmetrical patterns and the German complementary pattern, with its taboo on overt sub- missive behavior. The allied nations are not psychologically equipped to enforce a harsh treaty; they might draw up such a treaty, but in six months they would tire of keeping the underdog down. The Germans, on the other hand, if they see their role as “submissive,” will not stay down without harsh treatment. We have seen that these considerations ap- plied even to such a mildly punitive treaty as was devised at Versailles; the allies omitted to enforce it, and the Germans refused to accept it. It is, therefore, useless to dream of such a treaty, and worse than useless to repeat such dreams as a way of raising our morale now, when we are angry with Germany, To do that would only obscure the issues in the final settlement. This incompatibility between complementary and sym- metrical motivation means, in fact, that the treaty cannot be organized around simple dominance-submissive motifs; hence _ we are forced to look for alternative solutions. We. must ex- amine, for example, the motif of exhibitionism-spectatorship - _—what dignified role is each of the various nations best fitted to playP—and that of succoring-dependence—in the starving postwar world, what motivational patterns shall we
evoke between those who give and those who receive food? & And, alternative to these solutions, we have the possibility 7 a Be 108 Steps to an Ecology of Mind )
of some threefold-structure, within which both the allies and E Germany would submit, not to each other, but to some ab- stract principle. hs th ’ te. a ee a ate . at = a ere wen , . . ea a A tk RR oh a ie eee . re mye Cie hate | ae i A wy, at levy ’ ore ral sli . 78 4 BE REE AES attic ba Ya . ~ Bn , se ita

3. Bali: The Value System of a Steady State (1949)

Hali: The Value System of a Steady State* “Ethos” and “Schismogenesis” — : It would be an oversimplification—it would even be false = —to say that science necessarily advances by the construction zand empirical testing of successive working hypotheses. = Among the physicists and chemists there may be some who pag really proceed in this orthodox manner, but among the social @ecientists there is perhaps not one. Our concepts are loosely 2 fdefined—a haze of chiaroscuro prefiguring sharper lines still jundrawn—and our hypotheses are still so vague that rarely meecan we imagine any crucial instance whose investigation will test them. j. The present paper is an attempt to make more precise an idea which I published in 1936! and which has lain fallow Rince that time, The notion of ethos had proved a useful con- beptual tool for me, and with it I had been able to get a sharper understanding of Iatmul culture, But this experience by no means proved that this tool would necessarily be useful mM p other hands or for the analysis of other cultures. The most eneral conclusion I could draw was of this order: that my “*This essay appeared in Social Structure: Studies Pre- sented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, edited by Meyer Fortes, 1949, It is reprinted by permission of the Clarendon Press. Preparation of the essay was aided by a Guggen- heim Fellowship. *G. Bateson, Naven, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1936. | 107 SE a 108 Steps to an Ecology of Mind own mental processes had certain characteristics; that the | sayings, actions, and organization of the latmul had certain characteristics; and that the abstraction, “ethos,” performed ~ some role—catalytic, perhaps—in easing the relation between ~ these two specificities, my mind and the data which 1 myself ~ had collected. ‘Immediately. after completing the manuscript of Naven, I went to Bali with the intention of trying upon Balinese data this tool which had been evolved for the analysis of Iatmul. ~ For one reason or another, however, I did not do this, partly —- because in Bali Margaret Mead and I were engaged in devis- ing other tools—photo graphic methods of record and descrip- tion—and partly because I was learning the techniques of — applying genetic psychology to cultural data, but more es-— pecially because at some inarticulate level I felt that the tool It was not that ethos was in any sense disproved—indeed, a tool or a method can scarcely be proved false. It can only be shown to be not useful, and in this case there was not It is now possible to show with Balinese data what pecu- ~ Yarities of that culture may have influenced me away from.” ethological analysis, and this demonstration will lead to a e greater generalization of the abstraction, ethos. We shall in ~ the process make certain heuristic advances which may guide: us to more rigorous descriptive procedures in dealing with = other cultures. : y of organization of the instincts a (2) Analysis of Tatmul ethos—consisting in the ordering: or “themes”—led to recognition of schismogenesis. It a . peared that the working of Iatmul society involved inter :

Naven, p. 118. : Steps to an Ecology of Mind | 109 ¢ two classes of regenerative® or “vicious” circles, Both of these = were sequences of social interaction such that A’s acts were stimuli for B’s acts, which in tum became stimuli for more . intense action on the part of A, and so on, A and B being persons acting either as individuals or as group members. (3) These schismogenic sequences could be classified into two classes: (a) symmetrical schismogenesis, where the mu- tually promoting actions of A and B were essentially similar,

@.g., in cases of competition, rivalry, and the like; and (b) complementary schismogenesis, where the mutually promot- ~ ing actions are essentially dissimilar but mutually appropri- ate, @.g., in cases of dominance-submission, succoring-de- _ pendence, exhibitionism-spectatorship, and the like. ~ (4) In 1939 a considerable advance was made in defining ’ the formal relations between the concepts of symmetrical and _eomplementary schismogenesis. This came from an attempt -to state schismogenic theory in terms of Richardson’s equa- “ tlons for international armaments races. The equations for

rivalry evidently gave a first approximation to what I had ’ called “symmetrical schismogenesis.” These equations assume : . that the intensity of A’s actions (the rate of his arming, in | Richardson’s case) is simply proportional to the amount by | ahich B is ahead of A. The stimulus term in fact is (B —A), ®The terms “regenerative” and “degenerative” are bor- rowed from communications engineering. A regenerative or “vicious” circle is a chain of variables of the general type: increase in A causes increase in B; increase in B causes increase in C; … increase in N causes increase in A. Such a system, if provided with the necessary energy sources and if external factors permit, will clearly operate at a greater and greater rate or intensity. A “degenerative” or “self-corrective” circle differs from a re- generative circle in containing at least one link of the type: “increase in N causes decrease in M.” The house thermostat or the steam engine with a governor are ex- amples of such self-correcting systems. It will be noted that in many instances the same material circuit may be either regenerative or degenerative according to the amount of loading, frequency of impulses transmitted around the path, and time characteristics of the total path. “QL, F. Richardson, “Generalized Foreign Politics,” British Journal of Psychology, Monograph Supplement Xxiii, 1939, bh hele \ cas i hw ws ee ‘ mnengeneriier vmonirety a i che ry A ae . ’ 4 — Oe 110 Steps to an Ecology of Mind and when this term is positive it is expected that A will en- . gage in efforts to arm. Richardson’s second equation makes. - the same assumption mutatis mutandis about B’s actions, © These equations suggested that other simply rivalrous or com- - petitive phenomena—¢.g., boasting—though not subject to | such simple measurement as expenditure on armament, might = yet when ultimately measured be reducible to a simply analo- gous set of relations. | The matter was, however, not so clear in the case of com- plementary schismogenesis. Richardson’s equations for “sub- mission” evidently define a phenomenon somewhat different ~ from a progressive complementary relationship, and the form of his equations describes the action of a factor “submissive- | ness” which slows down and ultimately reverses the sign of warlike effort. What was, however, required to describe com- plementary schismogenesis was an equational form giving a sharp and discontinuous reversal of sign. Such an equational form is achieved by supposing A’s actions in a complementary relationship to be proportional to a stimulus term of the type (A —B). Such a form has also the advantage of automatically defining the actions of one of the participants as negative, and thus gives some mathematical analogue for the apparent psychological relatedness of domination to submission, exhibi-— tionism to spectatorship, succoring to dependence, etc. | Notably this formulation is itself a negative of the formula- tion for rivalry, the stimulus term being the opposite, It had . been observed that symmetrical sequences of actions tend -~ sharply to reduce the strain of excessively complementary re- lationships between persons or groups.5 It is tempting to as- cribe this effect to some hypothesis which would make the | “two types of schismogenesis in some degree psychologically — incompatible, as is done by the above formulation. | (5) It is of interest to note that all the modes associated with the erogenous zones,® though not clearly quantifiable,’ . define themes for complementary relationship. | ® Naven, p. 173. | | *H, H. Homburger, “Configurations in Play: Psycho- logical Notes,” Psychoanalytical Quarterly, 1937, vi: 2 138-214. This paper, one of the most important in thes literature seeking to state psychoanalytic hypotheses ing more rigorous terms, deals with the “modes” appropriate: to the various erogenous zones—intrusion, incorporation a

—_ a — Steps to an Ecology of Mind — lil (6) The link with erogenous zones suggested in 5, above, indicates that we ought, perhaps, not to think of simple rising exponential curves of intensity limited only by factors analo- gous to fatigue, such as Richardson’s equations would imply; but rather that we should expect our curves to be bounded by phenomena comparable to orgasm—that the achievement of a certain degree of bodily or neural involyement or inten- sity may be followed by a release of schismogenic tension. Indeed, all that we know about human beings in various sorts of simple contests would seem to indicate that this is the case, and that the conscious or unconscious wish for release of this kind is an important factor which draws the partici- pants on and prevents them from simply withdrawing from contests which would otherwise not commend themselves to “common sense.” If there be any basic human characteristic which makes man prone to struggle, it would seem to be this hope of release from. tension through total involvement. In the case of war this factor is undoubtedly often potent. (The rea] truth—that in modern warfare only a very few of the participants achieve this climactic release—seems

hardly to stand against the insidious myth of “total” war.) (7) In 1936 it was suggested that the phenomenon of _. “falling in love” might be comparable to a schismogenesis with the signs reversed, and even that “if the course of true Jove ever ran smooth it would follow an exponential curve.’7 Richardson® has since, independently, made the same point in more formal terms. Paragraph 6, above, clearly indicates _ that the “exponential curves” must give place to some type ‘of curve which will not rise indefinitely but will reach a cli- max and then fall. For the rest, however, the obvious relation- 1 ship of these interactive phenomena to climax and orgasm very much strengthens the case for regarding schismogenesis and those cumulative sequences of interaction which Jead to retention, and the like—and shows how these modes may be transferred from one zone to another. This leads the writer to a chart of the possible permutations and com- binations of such transferred modalities. This chart pro- vides precise means of describing the course of the development of a large variety of different types of char- acter structure (e.g., as met with in different cultures). 7 Naven, p. 197. ® Op. cit., 1939, UN em a 112 Steps to an Ecology of Mind love as often psychologically equivalent. (Witness the curious = confusions between fighting and lovemaking, the symboli = identifications of orgasm with death, the recurrent use by mammals of organs of offense as ornaments of sexual attrae *t tion, etc.) (8) Schismogenic sequences were not found in Bali. This negative statement is of such importance ‘and conflicts with * so many theories of social opposition and Marxian deter. minism that, in order to achieve credibility, I must here de- | scribe schematically the process of character formation, the _ resulting Balinese character structure, the exceptional in- — stances in which some sort of cumulative interaction can be. | recognized, and the methods by which quarrels and status differentiation are handled. (Detailed analysis of the various points and the supporting data cannot here be reproduced,’ but references will be given to published sources where the data can be examined. )® _ Balinese Character (a) The most important exception to the above generaliza- tion occurs in the relationship between adults (especiall parents) and children. Typically, the mother will start a small flirtation with the child, pulling its penis or otherwise stimu- lating it to interpersonal activity. T his will excite the child, and for a few moments cumulative interaction will occur. Then just as the child, approaching some small climax, flings its arms around the mother’s neck, her attention wanders, At this point the child will typically start an alternative cum- ulative interaction, building up toward temper tantrum. The mother will either play a-spectator’s role, enjoying the child’s tantrum, or, if the child actually attacks her, will brush off — his attack with no show of anger on her part. These se- quences can be seen either as an expression of the mother’s distaste for this type of personal involvement or as context _ in which the child acquires a deep distrust of such involve- ment, The perhaps basically human tendency towards cumu-: _ °See especially G. Bateson and M. Mead, Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis. Since this photo ~ re ‘ graphic record is available, no photographs are included in the present paper. ” 4 : : — - Steps to an Ecology of Mind 113 Jative personal interaction is thus muted.!° It is possible that some sort of continuing plateau of intensity is substituted for climax as the child becomes more fully adjusted to Balinese life. This cannot at present be clearly documented for sexual

yelations, but there are indications that a plateau type of se- quence is characteristic for trance and for quarrels (see d, below). (b) Similar sequences have the effect of diminishing the child’s tendencies toward competitive and rivalrous behavior. The mother will, for example, tease the child by suckling the baby of some other woman and will enjoy her own child’s efforts to push the intruder from the breast.” (c) In general the lack of climax is characteristic for Bali- nese music, drama, and other art forms. The music typically has a progression, derived from the logic of its formal struc- ture, and modifications of intensity determined by the dura- tion and progress of the working out of these formal relations. It does not have the sort of rising intensity and climax struc- ture characteristic of modern Occidental music, but rather a formal progression,12 (d) Balinese culture includes definite techniques for deal- _ ing with quarrels. Two men who have quarrelled will go for- mally to the office of the local representative of the Rajah and will there register their quarrel, agreeing that whichever speaks to the other shall pay a fine or make an offering to the gods, Later, if the quarrel terminates, this contract may be formally nullified. .Smaller—but similar—avoidances (pwik) are practiced, even by small children in their quar- reds, It is significant, perhaps, that this procedure is not an attempt to influence the protagonists away from hostility and toward friendship, Rather, it is a formal recognition of the state of their mutual relationship, and possibly, in some sort, a pegging of the relationship at that state. If this interpreta- tion is correct, this method of dealing with quarrels would |’. correspond to the substitution of a plateau for a climax. © Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis, pl. 47, and pp. 32-6. ” Ibid., pls. 49, 52, 53, and 69-72. - See Colin McPhee, “The Absolute Music of Bali,” Modern Music, 1935; and A House in Bali, London, Gollancz, 1947, : 4 e ’ : 114 Steps to an Ecology of Mind (e) In regard to warfare, contemporary comment on the 3 old wars between the Rajahs. indicates that in the period ~] when the comments were collected (1936-39) war was. thought of as containing large elements of mutual avoidance, The village of Bajoeng Gede was surrounded by an old vallum and foss, and the people explained the functions of these fortifications in the following terms: “If you and I had a quarrel, then you would go and dig a ditch around your house, Later I would come to fight with you, but I would find the ditch and then there would be no fight’—a sort of mutual Maginot Line psychology. Similarly the boundaries between neighboring kingdoms were, in general, a deserted no-man’s land inhabited only by vagrants and exiles. (A very different psychology of warfare was no doubt developed when the kingdom of Karangasem embarked on the conquest of the neighboring island of Lombok in the beginning of the eighteenth century. The psychology of this. militarism has not been investigated, but there is reason to believe that the time perspective of the Balinese colonists in Lombok is today sig- nificantly different from that of Balinese in Bali. )1® (f) The formal techniques of social influence—oratory and the like—are almost totally lacking in Balinese culture. To demand the continued attention of an individual or to exert emotional influence upon a group are alike distasteful and virtually impossible; because in such circumstances the atten- tion of the victim rapidly wanders. Even such continued speech as would, in most cultures, be used for the telling of stories does not occur in Bali, The narrator will, typically, pause after a sentence or two, and wait for some member of the audience to ask him a concrete question about some _ detail of the plot. He will then answer the question and so | resume his narration, This procedure apparently breaks the | cumulative tension by irrelevant interaction. 7 (g) The principal hierarchical structures in the society— the caste system and the hierarchy of full citizens who are ~ the village council—are rigid. There are no contexts in which .;. one individual could conceivably compete with another for position in either of these systems. An individual may lose E. : See G. Bateson, “An Old Temple and a New Myth,” Djawa, xvii, Batavia, 1937. J | Steps to an Ecology of Mind 115 his membership in the hierarchy for various acts, but his

Place in it cannot be altered, Should he later return to ortho- . doxy and be accepted back, he will return to his original position in relation to the other members,14 The foregoing descriptive generalizations are all partial an- Swers to a negative question—“Why is Balinese society non- schismogenic?”—and from the combination of these generali- zations we arrive at a picture of a society differing very markedly from our own, from that of the latmul, from those systems of social opposition which Radcliffe-Brown has ana- lyzed, and from any social structure postulated by Marxian | analysis. We started with the hypothesis that human beings have a tendency to involve themselves in sequences of cumulative interaction, and this hypothesis is still left virtually intact. Among the Balinese the babies, at east, evidently have such tendencies. But for sociological validity this hypothesis must now be guarded with a parenthetical clause stipulating that _ these tendencies are operative in the dynamics of society only | if the childhood training is not such as to prevent their ex- pression in adult life. We have made an advance in our knowledge of the scope of human character formation in demonstrating that these tendencies toward cumulative interaction are subject to some sort of modification, deconditioning, or inhibition.15 And this is an important advance. We know how it is that the Balinese are nonschismogenic and we know how their distaste for schismogenic patterns is expressed in various details of the social organization—the rigid hierarchies, the institutions for the handling of quarrels, etc.—but we still know nothing of the positive dynamics of the society. We have answered only the negative question. “See M. Mead, “Public Opinion Mechanisms among Primitive Peoples,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 1937, i: 5-

As is usual in anthropology, the data are not sufficjent- ly precise to give us any clue as to the nature of the learning processes involved. Anthropology, at best, is only able to raise problems of this Order. The next step must be left for laboratory experimentation. Oc ~_- 116 Steps to an Ecology of Mind Balinese E thos a The next step, therefore, ts to ask about Balinese ethos, What actually are the motives and the values which accom- pany the complex and rich cultural activities of the Balinese? What, if not competitive and other types of cumulative in- terrelationship, causes the Balinese to carry out the elaborate patterns of their lives? _ (1) It is immediately clear to any visitor to Bali that the driving force for cultural activity is not either acquisitiveness or crude physiological need. The Balinese, especially in the <f4. plains, are not hungry or poverty-stricken. They are wasteful “= of food, and a very considerable part of their activity goes of into entirely nonproductive activities of an artistic or ritual = nature in which food and wealth are lavishly expended. Es- 3} : : ’ 9 i. YP te be bade en ea | x . fe: ates ot pee eae ee a .* ‘ . : : ips ohh Ba Sane Nie _ ts SSE AE ae re he Ne : .g h: ; are ”¢ *. bel eet ’ 2

vN ” - . Hi ty “f a May» ws << sentially, we are dealing with an economy of plenty rather 24 Pe er than an economy of scarcity. Some, indeed, are rated “poor”? by their fellows, but none of these poor are threatened by 2 starvation, and the suggestion that human beings may actual-:<*” ly starve in great Occidental cities was, to the Balinese, un- 333 utterably shocking. = (2) In their economic transactions the Balinese show a4: “nenny wise.” On the other hand, this carefulness is counten#4 acted by occasional “pound foolishness” when they will exit
iS pend large sums of money upon ceremonials and other formas reer of lavish consumption. There are very few Balinese who havgz the idea of steadily maximizing their wealth or property these few are partly disliked and partly regarded as odditiesaay For the vast majority the “saving of pennies” is done ithe a limited time perspective and a limited level of aspiration They are saving until they have enough to spend largely ona some ceremonial. We should not describe Balinese economidg in terms of the individual’s attempt to maximize value, be _ rather compare it with the relaxation oscillations of physi ogy and engineering, realizing that not only is this analogy descriptive of their sequences of transactions, but that tigy themselves see these sequences as naturally having some su@y form. : ‘ Steps to an Ecology of Mind 117 A

(3) The Balinese are markedly dependent upon spatial = orientation. In order to be able to behave they must know < their cardinal points, and if a Balinese is taken by motor car

over twisting roads so that he loses his sense of direction,
he may become severely disorientated and unable to act (2.g., a dancer may become unable to dance) until he has _ got back his orientation by seeing some important landmark, *. such as the central mountain of the island around which the cardinal points are structured. There is a comparable de- pendence upon social orientation, but with this difference: ’ that where the spatial orientation is in a horizontal plane, social orientation is felt to be, in the main, vertical, When _, two strangers are brought together, it is necessary, before = they can converse with any freedom, that their relative caste |. positions be stated. One will ask the other, “Where do you = sitP” and this is a metaphor for caste. It is asking, essentially, x, “Do you sit high or low?” When each knows the caste of ;: the other, each will then know what etiquette and what lin- “¢ guistic forms he should adopt, and conversation can then pro- iL ceed. Lacking such orientation, a Balinese is tongue-tied. a (4) It is common to find that activity (other than the #,. “penny wisdom” mentioned above) rather than being pur- Fe posive, t.¢., aimed at some deferred goal, is valued for itself. {The artist, the dancer, the musician, and the priest may re-

ceive a pecuniary reward for their professional activity, but j only in rare cases is this reward adequate to recompense the & artist even for his time and materials, The reward is a token = of appreciation, it is a definition of the context in which the ‘’@ theatrical company performs, but it is not the economic main- ‘ae stay of the troupe. The earnings of the troupe may be saved Bup to enable them to buy new costumes, but when finally Meine costumes are bought it is usually necessary for every ymember to make a considerable contribution to the common ‘fund in order to pay for them. Similarly, in regard to the { offerings which are taken to every temple feast, there is no jpurpose in this enormous expenditure of artistic work and real wealth. The god will not bring any benefit because you smade a beautiful structure of flowers and fruit for the calen- ric feast in his temple, nor will he avenge your abstention. Instead of deferred purpose there is an immediate and imma- nent satisfaction in performing beautifully, with everybody 118 Steps to an Ecology of Mind context. (5) In general there is evident enjoyment to be had from % doing things busily with large crowds of other people.1® Con- versely there is such misfortune inherent in the loss of group membership that the threat of this loss is one of the most serious sanctions in the culture. | | | (6) It is of great interest to note that many Balinese ac- tions are articulately accounted for in sociological terms rather than in terms of individual goals or values.” This is most conspicuous in regard to all actions related to the village council, the hierarchy which includes all full citizens. This body, in its secular aspects, is referred to as ~ I Desa (literally, “Mr. Village”), and numerous rules and procedures are rationalized by reference to this abstract per- sonage. Similarly, in its sacred aspects, the village is deified as Betara Desa (God Village), to whom shrines are erected and offerings brought. (We may guess that a Durkheimian analysis would seem to the Balinese to be an obvious and appropriate approach to the understanding of much of their public culture. ) | | In particular all money transactions which involve the vil- lage treasury are governed by the generalization, “The village does not lose” (Desanne sing dadi potjol). This generaliza- tion applies, for example, in all cases in which a beast is sold from the village herd. Under no circumstances can the — village accept a price less than that which it actually or nomi- nally paid. (It is important to note that the rule takes the . form of fixing a lower limit and is not an injunction to maxi- — mize the village treasury. ) , — A peculiar awareness of the nature of social processes _ is evident in such incidents as the following: A poor man was . ~’ about to: undergo one of the important and expensive rites =. de passage which are necessary for persons as they approach es the top of the council hierarchy. We asked what would hap- +. pen if he refused to undertake this expenditure, The first 3° answer was that, if he were too poor, I Desa would lend… 1° Bateson and Mead, op. cit., pl. 5. 7 Cf. Naven, pp. 250 ff., where it was suggested that wea ~ must expect to find that some peoples of the world would relate their actions to the sociological frame. . 7 Steps to an Ecology of Mind | 119 him the money. In response to further pressing as to what would happen if he really refused, we were told that nobody ever had refused, but that if somebody did, nobody would go through the ceremony again. Implicit in this answer and in the fact that nobody ever does refuse is the assumption that the ongoing cultural process is itself to be valued. (7) Actions which are culturally correct (patoet) are ac- ceptable and aesthetically valued. Actions which are permis- sible (dadi) are of more or less neutral value; while actions which are not permissible (sing dadi) are to be deprecated and avoided. These generalizations, in their translated form, are no doubt true in many cultures, but it is important to get a clear understanding of what the Balinese mean by dadi. The notion is not to be equated with our “etiquette” or “law,” since each of these invokes the value judgment of some other person or sociological entity, In Bali there is no feeling that actions have been or are categorized as dadi or sing dadi by some human or supernatural authority, Rather, the state- ment that such-and-such an action is dadi is an absolute gen- eralization to the effect that under the given circumstances this action is regular.1® It is wrong for a casteless person to address a prince in other than the “polished language,” and it is wrong for a menstruating woman to enter a temple. The prince or the deity may express annoyance, but there is no feeling that either the prince, the deity, or the casteless per- son made the rules. The offense is felt to be against the order and natural structure of the universe rather than against the _ actual person offended. The offender, even in such serious matters as incest (for which he may be extruded from the _ society)?® is not blamed for anything worse than stupidity and clumsiness, Rather, he is “an unfortunate person” (anak “ latjoer), and misfortune may come to any of us “when it

Is our turn.” Further, it must be stressed that these patterns — which define correct and permissible behavior are exceedingly “. complex (especially the rules of language) and that the indi-

The word dadi is also used as a copula referring to changes in social status. J Anoe dadj Koebajan means “So-and-so has become a village official.” ” Mead, “Public Opinion Mechanisms among Primi- tive Peoples,” loc. cit., 1937… — ————————— LL tt—“‘_

Sontag ae FT Ges PX pe ee a either in a simple recipe or an em 120 Steps to an Ecology of Mind vidual Balinese (even to some degree inside his own family) 4 has continual anxiety lest he make an error. Moreover, the~ = rules are not of such a kind that they can be summarized otional attitude. Etiquette. cannot be deduced from some comprehensive statement — 2 about the other person’s feelings or from respect for superiors, ~ The details are too complex and too various for this, and s such simple variables, In order to define the sort of contrast which exists between @ the Balinese system and any competitive system, let us start By considering the premisses of a strictly competitive Von Neumannian game and proceed by considering what changes @we must make in these premisses in order to approximate

more closely to the Balinese system.

3 4 (1) The players in a Von Neumannian game are, by “Bpbypothesis, motivated only in terms of a single linear (sc. “@imonetary) scale of value, Their strategies are determined: (a) by the rules of the hypothetical game; and (b) by their ‘ intelligence, which is, by hypothesis, sufficient to solve all 3 problems presented by the game. Von Neumann shows that, E@minder certain definable circumstances depending upon the S@enumber of players and upon the rules, coalitions of various horts will be formed by the players, and in fact Von Neu- Mmann’s analysis concentrates mainly upon the structure of these coalitions and the distribution of value among the members. In comparing these games with human societies we Pe a = - ny a 122 . Steps to an Ecology of Mind shall regard social organizations ‘as analogous to coalition systems.° : | (2) Von Neumannian systems differ from human societies in the following respects: | (a) His “players” are from the start completely intelligent, whereas human beings learn. For human beings we must | expect that the rules of the game and the conventions asso- | ciated with any particular set of coalitions will become in- | corporated into the character structures of the individual ~ players. | (b) The mammalian value scale is not simple and mono- tone, but may be’ exceedingly complex. We know, even at a | physiological level, that calcium will not replace vitamins, nor will an amino acid replace oxygen. Further, we know that the animal does not strive to maximize its supply of any of these discrepant commodities, but rather is required to main- tain the supply of each within tolerable limits. Too much may be as harmful as too little. It is also doubttul whether mammalian preference is always transitive. (c) In the Von Neumannian system the number of moves in a given “play” of a game is assumed to be finite, The _ strategic problems of the individuals are. soluble because the . individual can operate within a limited time perspective. He need only look forward a finite distance to the end of the play when the gains and losses will be paid up and every- thing will start again from a tabula rasa. In human society life = Alternatively, we might handle the analogy in another way. A social system is, a3 Von Neumann and Morgen- stern point out, comparable to a non-zero sum game in which one or more coalitions of people play against each other and against nature. The non-zero sum characteristic is based on the fact that value is continually extracted | from the natural environment. Inasmuch as Balinese society exploits nature, the total entity, including both environment and people, is clearly comparable to a | game requiring coalition between people. It is possible, however, that that subdivision of the total game com- prising the people only might be such that the formation | of coalitions within it would not be essential—that is, -”| Balinese society may differ from most other societies in.; = 3 ty that the “rules” of the relationship between people de-s fine a “game” of the type Von Neumann would call “none g¥ essential.” This possibility is not here examined. (Seq Yon Neumann and Morgensterm, op. cit.) Steps to an Ecology of Mind - 123 is not punctuated in this way, and each individual faces a vista of unknowable factors whose number increases (prob- ably exponentially) into the future. (d) The Von Neumannian players are, by hypothesis, not susceptible either to economic death or to boredom. The losers can go on losing forever, and no player can withdraw from the game, even though the outcome of every play is definitely predictable in probability terms. (3) Of these differences between Von Neumannian and human systems, only the differences in value scales and the possibility of “death” concern us here. For the sake of sim- plicity we shall assume that the other differences, though very profound, can for the moment be ignored. : _ (4) Curiously, we may note that, although men are mam- mals and therefore have a primary value system which is multidimensional and nonmaximizing, it is yet possible for these creatures to be put into contexts in which they will strive to maximize one or a few simple variables (money, prestige, power, etc.). (5) Since the multidimensional value system is apparently primary, the problem presented by, for example, Iatmul social organization is not so much to account for the be- havior of Iatmul individuals by invoking (or abstracting) their value system; we should also ask how that value system is imposed on the mammalian individuals by the social orga- nization in which they find themselves, Conventionally in anthropology this question is attacked through genetic psychology. We endeavor to collect data to show how the value system implicit in the social organization is built into the character structure of the individuals in their childhood. There is, however, an alternative approach which would momentarily ignore, as Von Neumann does, the phenomena of learning and consider merely the strategic implications of those contexts which must occur in accordance with the given “rules” and the coalition system. In this connection it is important to note that competitive contexts—provided the individuals can be made to recognize the contexts as -. competitive—inevitably reduce the complex gamut of values . to very simple and even linear and monotone terms.?6 Con- “LL. K, Frank, “The Cost of Competition,” Plan Age, 1940, vi: 314-24. 124 Steps to an Ecology of Mind siderations of this sort, plus descriptions of the regularities in the process of character formation, probably suffice to de- —- 4 3 F scribe how simple value scales are imposed upon mammalian _ individuals in competitive societies such as that of the Jatmul or twentieth-century America. : (6) In Balinese society, on the other hand, we find an entirely different state of affairs. Neither the individual nor the village is concerned to maximize any simple variable, Rather, they would seem to be concerned to maximize some- | thing which we may call stability, using this term perhaps in a highly metaphorical way. (There is, in fact, one simple quantitative variable which does appear to be maximized. This variable is the amount of any fine imposed by the village. When first imposed the fines are mostly very small, but if payment is delayed the amount of the fine is increased very steeply, and if there be any sign that the offender is refusing to pay—‘opposing the village’—the fine is at once raised to an enormous sum and the offender is deprived of membership in the community until he is willing to give up his opposition. Then a part of the fine may be excused. ) (7) Let us now consider an hypothetical system consisting of a number of identical players, plus an umpire who is con- cerned with the maintenance of stability among the players. Let us further suppose that the players are liable to economic death, that our umpire is concerned to see that this shall not. occur, and that the umpire has power to make certain altera- tions in the rules of the game or in the probabilities associated with chance moves, Clearly this umpire will be in more or less continual conflict with the players. He is striving to main- tain a dynamic equilibrium or steady state, and this we may . rephrase as the attempt to maximize the chances against the ‘Inaximization of any single simple variable. (8) Ashby has pointed out in rigorous terms that the steady state and continued existence of complex interactive systems depend upon preventing the maximization of any | : variable, and that any continued increase in any variable will inevitably result in, and be limited by, irreversible | | changes in the system. He has also pointed out that in such systems it is very important to permit certain variables to J alter.27 The steady state of an engine with a governor is 4 “W.R. Ashby, “Effect of Controls on Stability,” Na- , ture, clv, no. 3930, February 24, 1945, 242-43. | Steps to an Ecology of Mind unlikely to be maintaine bn). 4 GQ : 5 S| a 2, E © Q, d Fi. fo ga =” 3 e) ze, ®

pe) a g E- f> In their daily life, however, they are stil] engaged in simple (10) The next ste P toward making o ae ani de more woey is clearly to rot ; sucture of the individuals and/or j : oF ineir daily life those factors which af motives ‘th mn war + maintenance of the steady state not only when th sy a ak n council, but also in their other interpersonal relation. Ors are in fact recognizable in Balj and have been _ determined. This | | uned. Steady state is intai nonprogressive change, 4 marmrained by continual ———SSoCC~—sr—(aeeeeeeeeeesése 126 Steps to an Ecology of Mind Schismogenic System versus the Steady State I have discussed two types of social system in such schematic outline that it is possible to state clearly a contrast between them. Both types of system, so far as they are capable of maintaining themselves without progressive or ir- reversible change, achieve the steady state. There are, how- ever, profound differences between them in the manner in which the steady state is regulated. , | The Jatmul system, which is here used as a prototype of schismogenic systems, includes a number of regenerative causal circuits or vicious circles. Each such circuit consists of two or more ‘ndividuals (or groups of individuals) who participate in potentially cumulative interaction. Each human individual is an energy source OF “relay,” such that the energy used in his responses is not derived from the stimuli but from his own metabolic processes. It therefore follows that such a schismogenic system ‘s—unless controlled— liable to excessive increase of those acts which characterize the schismogeneses. The anthropologist who attempts even a qualitative description of such a system must therefore identify: (1) the individuals and groups involved in schismo- genesis and the routes of communication between them; (2) the categories of acts and contexts characteristic of the schismogeneses; (3) the processes whereby the individuals become psychologically apt to perform these acts and/or the nature of the contexts which force these acts upon them; and lastly, (4) be must identify the mechanisms OF factors which control the schismogeneses. These controlling factors may be of at least three distinct types: (a) degenerative causal loops may be superposed upon the schismogeneses SO that when the latter reach a certain intensity some form of restraint is applied—as occurs ‘71 Occidental systems when — a government intervenes to limit economic competition; (b) there may be, in addition to the schismogeneses already con- sidered, other cumulative interactions acting in an opposite sense and so promoting social integration rather than fission; (c) the increase in schismogenesis may be limited by factors: which are internally or externally environmental to the parts | Steps to an Ecology of Mind 127 small restraining effect at low intensities of schismogenesis may increase with increase of intensity. Friction, fatigue, and limitation of energy supply would be examples of such factors. In contrast with these schismogenic systems, Balinese so- ciety is an entirely different type of mechanism, and in de- scribing it the anthropologist must follow entirely different procedures, for which rules cannot as yet be laid down, Since the class of “nonschismogenic” social systems is defined only in negative terms, we cannot assume that members of the class will have common characteristics. In the analysts of the Balinese system, however, the following steps oc- curred, and it is possible that some at least of these may be applicable in the analysis of other cultures of this class: (1) it was observed that schismogenic sequences are rare in Bali; (2) the exceptional cases in which such sequences occur were investigated; (3) from this investigation it ap- peared, (a) that in general the contexts which recur in Balinese social life preclude cumulative interaction and (b) that childhood experience trains the child away from seeking climax in personal interaction; (4) it was shown that certain positive values—related to balance—recur in the culture and are incorporated into the character structure during child- hood, and, further, that these values may be specifically re- lated to the steady state; (5) a more detailed study is now required to arrive at a systematic statement about the self- correcting characteristics of the system. It is evident that the ethos alone is insufficient to maintain the steady state, From time to time the village or some other entity does step in to correct infractions. The nature of these instances of the work- _ ing of the corrective mechanism must be studied; but it is clear that this intermittent mechanism is very different from the continually acting restraints which must be present in all schismogenic systems.

4. From Versailles to Cybernetics (1966)

From Versailles to Cyhernetics* I have to talk about recent history as it appears to me in my generation and to you in yours and; as I flew in this morning, words began to echo in my mind, These were phrases more thunderous than any I might be able to compose. One of these groups of words was, “The fathers have eaten bitter fruit and the children’s teeth are set on edge.” Another was the statement of Joyce that “history is that nightmare from which there is no awakenin g. Another was, “The sins of the fathers shall be visited on the children even to the third and fourth generation of those that hate me.” And lastly, not so immediately relevant, but still I _ think relevant to the problem of social mechanism, “He who would do good to another must do it in Minute Particulars. General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer.” - SO 7: We are talking about serious things. I call this lecture “From Versailles to Cybernetics,” naming the two historic events of the twentieth century. The word “cybernetics” is familiar, is it notP But how many of you know what hap- pened at Versailles in 1919? The question is, What is going to count as important in the _ history of the last sixty years? I am sixty-two, and, as I be- gan to think about what I have seen of history in my life- *Previously unpublished. This lecture was given April 21, 1966, to the “Two Worlds Symposium” at Sacra- mento State College. 469 470 Steps to an Ecology of Mind j z time, it seemed to me that I had really only seen twomoments = that would rate as really important from an anthropologist’s © point of view. One was the events leading up to the Treaty _ of Versailles, and the other was the cybernetic breakthrough. You may be surprised or shocked that I have not mentioned the A-bomb, or even World War II. I have not mentioned the spread of the automobile, nor of the radio and TV, nor many other things that have occurred in the last sixty years, ) . Let me state my criterion of historicalimportance: _., Mammals in general, and we among them, care extremely, not about episodes, but about the patterns of their relation- ships. When you open the refrigerator door and the cat comes up and makes certain sounds, she. is not talking about liver or milk, though you may know very well that that is what she wants. You may be able to guess correctly and give her that—if there is. any in the refrigerator, What she ac- tually says is something about the relationship between her- | self and you. If you translated her message into words, it would be something like, “dependency, dependency, depen- dency.” She is talking, in fact, about a rather abstract pat- tern within a relationship. From that assertion of a pattern, you are expected to go from the general to the specific—to deduce “milk” or “liver.” | This is crucial. This is what mammals are about. They are concemmed with patterns of relationship, with where they stand in love, hate, respect, dependency, trust, and similar abstractions, vis-a-vis somebody else. This is where it hurts us to be put in the ‘wrong, If we trust and find that that which we have trusted was untrustworthy; or if we distrust, and find that that which we distrusted was in fact trust- worthy, we feel bad, The pain that liuman beings and all other mammals can suffer from this type of error is extreme. If, therefore, we really want to know what are the significant _ points in history, we have to ask which are the moments in history when attitudes were changed. These are the mo- ments when people are hurt because of their former “values,” : _ Think of the house thermostat in your home. The weather changes outdoors, the temperature of the room falls, the _ thermometer switch in the living room goes through its busi- ness and switches on the furnace; and the furnace warms : p> Steps to an Ecology of Mind 471 the room and when the room is hot, the thermometer switch turns it off again. The system is what is called a homeostatic circuit or a:servocircuit. But there is also a little box in the living room on the wall by which you set the thermostat. If the house has been too cold for the last week, you must move it up from its present setting to make the system now oscillate around a new level. No amount of weather, heat or cold or whatever, will change that setting, which is called the “bias” of the system. The temperature of the house will oscillate, it will get hotter and cooler according to various circumstances, but the setting ‘of the mechanisrn will not be changed by those changes. But when you go and you move that bias, you will change what we may call the “attitude” of the system. — Similarly, the important question about history is: Has the bias or setting been changed? The episodic working out of events under a single stationary setting is really trivial. It is with this thought in mind that I have said that the two most important historic events in my life were the Treaty of Ver- sailles and the discovery of cybernetics. Most of you probably hardly know how the Treaty of Versailles came into being. The story is very simple. World War I dragged on and on; the Germans were rather ob- viously losing, At this point, George Creel, a public relations man—and I want you not to forget that this man was a granddaddy of modern public relations—had an idea: the idea was that maybe the Germans would surrender if we offered them soft armistice terms, He therefore drew up a set of soft terms, according to which there would be no punitive measures, These terms were drawn up in fourteen points. These Fourteen Points he passed on to President Wil- son. If you are going to deceive somebody, you had better get an honest man to carry the message. President Wilson was an almost pathologically honest man and a humanitarian. He elaborated the points in a number of speeches: there were to be “no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages …” and so on. And the Germans surrendered. We, British and Americans—especially the British—con- tinued of course to blockade Germany because we didn’t want them to get uppity before the Treaty was signed. So, for another year, they continued to starve. The Peace Conference has been vividly described by 472, Steps to an Ecology of Mind Maynard Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). oe The Treaty was finally drawn up by four men: Clemen- ceau, “the tiger,” who wanted to crush Germany; Lloyd George, who felt it would be politically expedient to get a lot of reparations out of Germany, and some revenge; and | Wilson, who had to be bamboozled along, Whenever Wilson would wonder about those Fourteen Points of his, they took him out into the war cemeteries and made him feel ashamed - of not being angry with the Germans. Who was the other? Orlando was the other, an Italian. 7 This was one of the great sellouts in the history of our civilization. A most extraordinary event which led fairly di- rectly and inevitably into World War II. It also led (and this is perhaps more interesting than the fact of its leading to World War II) to the total demoralization of German politics, If you promise your boy something, and renege on him, framing the whole thing on a high ethical plane, you will probably find that not only is he very angry with you, but that his moral attitudes deteriorate as long as he feels the unfair whiplash of what you are doing to him, It’s not only that World War II was the appropriate response of a nation which had been treated in this particular way; what is more important is the fact that the demoralization of that nation was expectable from this sort of treatment. From the demoralization of Germany, we, too, became demoralized. This is why I say that the Treaty of Versailles was an at- titudinal turning point. I imagine that we have another couple of generations of aftereffects from that particular sellout to work through. We are, in fact, like members of the house of Atreus in Greek tragedy. First there was Thyestes’ adultery, then Atreus’ killing of Thyestes’ three children, whom he served to Thy- estes at a peace-making feast. Then the murder of Atreus’ son, Agamemnon, by Thyestes’ son, Aegistheus; and finally the murder of Aegistheus and Clytemnestra by Orestes. It goes on and on. The tragedy of oscillating and self- propagating distrust, hate, and destruction down the gen- erations. | I want you to imagine that you come into the middle of one of these sequences of tragedy. How is it for the middle — a7 «. generation of the house of Atreus? They are living in a F § Steps to an Ecology of Mind 473 crazy universe. From the point of view of the people who started the mess, it’s not so crazy; they know what hap- pened and how they got there. But the people down the line, who were not there at the beginning, find themselves living in a crazy universe, and find themselves crazy, pre- cisely because they do not know how they got that way. To take a dose of LSD is all right, and you will have the experience of being more or less crazy, but this will make quite good sense because you know you took the dose of LSD, If, on the other hand, you took the LSD by accident, and then find yourself going crazy, not knowing how you got there, this is a terrifying and horrible experience. This is a much more serious and terrible experience, very different from the trip which you can enjoy if you know you took the - LSD. Now consider the difference between my generation and you who are under twenty-five. We all live in the same crazy universe whose hate, distrust, and hypocrisy relates back (especially at the international level) to the Fourteen Points and the Treaty of Versailles. We older ones know how we got here. I can remember my father reading the Fourteen Points at the breakfast table and saying, “By golly, they’re going to give them a decent armistice, a decent peace,” or something of the kind. And I can remember, but I will not attempt to verbalize, the sort of thing he said when the Treaty of Versailles came out. It wasn’t printable. So I know more or less how we got here. But from your point of view, we are absolutely crazy, and you don’t know what sort of historic event led to this crazi- ness. “The fathers have eaten bitter fruit and the children’s teeth are set on edge.” It’s all very well for the fathers, they know what they ate, The children don’t know what was | eaten, . Let us consider what is to be expected of people in the aftermath of a major deception. Previous to World War I, it was generally assumed that compromise and a little hypoc- risy are a very. important ingredient in the ordinary com- fortableness of life. If you read Samuel Butler’s Erewhon Revisited, for example, you will see what I mean. All the principal characters in the novel have got themselves into an’ awful mess: some are due to be executed, and others are due for public scandal, and the religious system of the na- 474 Steps to an Ecology of Mind tion is threatened with collapse. These disasters and tangles 3 are smoothed out by Mrs. Ydgrun (or, as we would say, ‘ “Mrs. Grundy”), the guardian of Erewhonian morals. She . carefully reconstructs history, like a jigsaw puzzle, so that 4 nobody is really hurt and nobody is disgraced—still less is % anybody executed. This was a very comfortable philosophy. _ A little hypocrisy and a little compromise oil the wheels of — social life. 7 | But after the great deception, this philosophy is unten- | able. You are perfectly correct that something is wrong; and — that the something wrong is of the nature of a deceit.and a — hypocrisy. You liye in the midst of corruption. —— Of course, your natural responses are puritanical. Not sex- ual puritanism, because it is not a sexual deceit that lies in the background. But an extreme puritanism against com- | promise, a puritanism against hypocrisy, and this ends up asa | reduction of life to little pieces. It is the big integrated structures of life that seem to have carried the lunacy, and so you try to focus down on the smallest things. “He who would do good to another must do it in Minute Particulars, General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and’ flatterer.” The general good smells of hypocrisy to the rising generation. : I don’t doubt that if you asked George Creel to justify the Fourteen Points, he would urge the general good. It is pos- . sible that that little operation of his saved a few thousand American lives in 1918. I don’t know how many it cost in World War II, and since in Korea and Vietnam. I recall that | Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified by the general good and saving American lives. There was a lot of talk about { “unconditional surrender,” perhaps because we could not trust ourselves to honor a conditional armistice. Was the fate | of Hiroshima determined at Versailles? . Now I want to talk about the other significant historical | event which has happened in my lifetime, approximately in 1946-47, This was the growing together of a number of ideas _ which had developed in different places during World War ; II. We may call the aggregate of these ideas cybernetics, or -% communication theory, or information theory, or systems the- % ory. The ideas were generated in many places: in Vienna by & Bertalanffy, in Harvard by Wiener, in Princeton by von Neu-¥ mann, in Bell Telephone labs by Shannon, in Cambridge by Steps to an Ecology of Mind 475 Craik, and so on. All these separate developments in dif- ferent intellectual centers dealt with communicational prob- lems, especially with the problem of what sort of a thing is an organized system. You will notice that everything I said about history and about Versailles is a discussion of organized systems and their properties. Now I want to say that we are developing a cer- tain amount of rigorous scientific understanding of these very mysterious organized systems, Our knowledge today is way ahead of anything that George Creel could have said. He was an applied scientist before the science was ripe to be applied. One of the roots of cybernetics goes back to Whitehead and Russell and what is. called the Theory of Logical Types. In principle, the name is not the thing named, and the name of the name is not the name, and so on. In terms of this powerful theory, a message about war is not part of the war. Let me put it this way: the message “Let’s play chess” is not a move in the game of chess, It is a message in a more abstract language than the language of the game on the board, The message “Let’s make peace on such and such terms” is not within the same ethical system as the deceits and tricks of battle. They say that all is fair in love and war, _ and that may be true within love and war, but outside and about love and war, the ethics are a little different. Men have felt for centuries that treachery in a truce or peace- making is worse than trickery in battle. Today this ethical

principle receives -rigorous theoretical and scientific support. The ethics can now be looked at with formality, rigor, logic, mathematics, and all that, and stands on a different sort of basis from mere invocational preachments. We do not have to feel our way; we can sometimes know right from wrong. _ I included cybernetics as the second historic event of importance in my lifetime because I have at least a dim hope that we can bring ourselves to use this new understanding with some honesty. If we understand a little bit of what were doing, maybe it will help us to find our way out of the maze of hallucinations that we have created around our- selves. Cybernetics is, at any rate, a contribution to change—not simply a change in attitude, but even a change in the under- standing of what an attitude is. 476 Steps to an Ecology of Mind The stance that I have taken in choosing what is important in history—saying that the important things are the moments at which attitude is determined, the moments at which the bias of the thermostat is changed—this stance is derived directly from cybernetics. These are thoughts shaped by events from 1946 and after, | But pigs do not go around ready-roasted. We now have a lot of cybernetics, a lot of games theory, and the beginnings of understanding of complex systems. But any understanding can be used in destructive ways. I think that cybernetics is the biggest bite out of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge that mankind has taken in the last 2000 years. But most of such bites out of the apple have proved to be rather indigestible—usually for cybernetic rea- sons, Cybernetics has integrity within itself, to help us to not be seduced by it into more lunacy, but we cannot trust it to keep us from sin. | For example, the state departments of several nations are today using games theory, backed up by computers, as a way of deciding international policy, They identify first what seem to be the rules of the game of international in- teraction; they then consider the distribution of strength, weapons, strategic points, grievances, etc., over the geogra- phy and the identified nations. They then ask the computers to compute what should be our next move to minimize the chances of our losing the game. The computer then cranks and heaves and gives an answer, and there is some tempta- © tion to obey the computer, After all, if you follow the com- puter you are a little less responsible than if you made up. your own mind. | But if you do what the computer advises, you assert by _ that move that you support the rules of the game which you fed into the computer. You have affirmed the rules of that ame, . No doubt nations of the other side also have computers and are playing similar games, and are affirming the rules of the game that they are feeding to their computers. The re- sult is a system in which the rules of international interaction become more and more rigid. I submit to you that what is wrong with the international field is that the rules need changing. The question is not Steps to an Ecology of Mind 477 what is the best thing to do within the rules as they are at the moment. The question is how can we get away from the rules within which we have been operating for the last ten or twenty years, or since the Treaty of Versailles, The prob- Jem is to change the rules, and insofar as we let our cyber- more rigid situations, we shall in fact be maltreating and abusing the first hopeful advance since 1918. And, of course, there are other dangers Jatent in cyber- netics and many of these are still unidentified. We do not know, for example, what effects may follow from the com-

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Bateson G. — Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972) — главы о схизмогенезе